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DUAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE DOUBLE
JEOPARDY CLAUSE: IF AT FIRST YOU
DON'T CONVICT, TRY, TRY AGAIN
Robert Matz*
Introduction
On August 10, 1994, the United States indicted Lemrick Nelson
for violating the civil rights of Yankel Rosenbaum, an Australian
rabbinical student.1 Two years earlier, however, a New York State
jury acquitted Nelson of Rosenbaum's murder.2 Did the federal
indictment serve justice3 or did it violate Nelson's Fifth Amend-
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 1997; M.B.A., State Uni-
versity of New York (Binghamton), 1990; B.A.. University of Rochester, 1988.
1. Riots erupted in the Crown Heights section of New York City following the
tragic death of Gavin Cato, a seven year old black boy who was struck by a car in the
motorcade carrying Lubavitcher Grand Rabbi Menachem Schneerson. Tensions be-
tween blacks and Hasidic Jews were raised by stories that the first ambulance to ar-
rive on the scene, which was owned and operated by members of the Hasidic
community, attended to the elderly couple responsible for the accident rather than
treat the child. On August 19, 1991, Yankel Rosenbaum was stabbed during the ensu-
ing riots a mere three blocks from the scene of the car accident. Bob Liff & Jennifer
Preston, Mayor Acts Swiftly to Quell Trouble, NEWSDAY, Aug. 21, 1991 (City Home
Edition), at 29.
Nelson was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) (1994) "which imposes
criminal penalties for civil rights violations involving interference with federally pro-
tected activities." United States v. Nelson, 921 F. Supp. 105, 107-08 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
Nelson's alleged conduct constituted a federal offense because the act precluded Ro-
senbaum from walking on the public streets of New York. See Abraham Abramov-
sky, An Adult in State Court; a Juvenile in Federal Court, N.Y. L.J., June 2, 1995, at 3.
On February 19, 1997, a Federal jury convicted Nelson of depriving Yankel Rosen-
baum of his civil rights. Joseph P. Fried, 2 Guilty in Fatal Crown Hts. Violence, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 1997, at Al.
2. Patricia Hurtado, Lawyer Calls Crown Heights Case Vindictive, NEWSDAY,
Nov. 18, 1995 (Queens Edition), at A18. Evidence suggests that Rosenbaum's death
may have been prevented had he received adequate medical assistance while in the
emergency room of Kings County Hospital Center. Jim Dwyer, Obscure Justice Better
Than None, NEWSDAY, Sept. 9, 1994, at A2.
3. Following Nelson's acquittal, a key defense witness recanted testimony he
gave at trial, thereby implicating Nelson's guilt. See Abramovsky, supra note 1, at 3.
However, despite the defense witness's admission that he committed perjury, the
Constitution of the State of New York's prohibition against double jeopardy pre-
cluded the State from retrying Nelson for Rosenbaum's murder. Id.; N.Y. CONST. art.
I, § 6 ("No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.").
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ment right under the Double Jeopardy Clause to be free from be-
ing tried more than once for the same offense? 4
The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy pro-
tects an individual from being tried after he or she has been acquit-
ted by a jury.5 The ban on double jeopardy, however, is
contradicted by the doctrine of dual sovereignty, which provides
that each sovereign is free to vindicate its own rights within its re-
spective sphere of influence, unencumbered by the actions of other
distinct sovereigns.6 As a result, when a criminal defendant's con-
duct violates the laws of two independent sovereigns with overlap-
ping jurisdictions, a criminal prosecution regarding that conduct
may be brought by either or both sovereigns despite previous ac-
quittal. The application of the dual sovereignty doctrine in this
context highlights the conflict that results when an individual's
right to be free from double jeopardy is trumped by concurrent
federal and state jurisdiction.
This Note argues that the application of the dual sovereignty
doctrine to cases involving successive state and federal prosecu-
tions, where the initial prosecution resulted in an acquittal, violates
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Part I dis-
cusses the rationale for the prohibition against double jeopardy
and the principle of dual sovereignty. Part II outlines the Supreme
Court jurisprudence regarding successive prosecutions brought by
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V. In order to successfully prosecute Nelson for violating
Rosenbaum's civil rights, the United States must prove that Nelson committed the
murder, a crime he was previously acquitted of by a New York jury. See Mordecai
Rosenfeld, Essay, Kewpie Dolls and the Constitution, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 22, 1994, at 2
(1994).
5. The Supreme Court has held that the "'constitutional prohibition against
"double jeopardy" was designed to protect an individual from being subjected to the
hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense."'
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) (citations omitted). Commentators
maintain that the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to give prosecutors one
chance, and one chance only, to convict. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, supra note 4.
6. See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 381-84 (1922). The Supreme Court,
applying the principle of dual sovereignty for the first time, discussed the relationship
between the national government and the several States under the framework of fed-
eralism as follows:
We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources, ca-
pable of dealing with the same subject-matter within the same territory.
Each may, without interference by the other, enact laws to secure prohibi-
tion, with the limitation that no legislation can give validity to acts prohib-
ited by the Amendment. Each government in determining what shall be an
offense against its peace and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty, not
that of the other.
Id. at 382.
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independent sovereigns. Part III reviews the arguments against ap-
plying the dual sovereignty doctrine in the context of successive
prosecutions where the initial prosecution resulted in an acquittal
and proposes that the Supreme Court reconsider the doctrine and
confine its application strictly to cases involving persons acting
under the color of state authority. This Note concludes that the
present application of the principle of dual sovereignty violates the
Constitution and derogates the integrity of the American criminal
justice system.
I. Rationale For The Double Jeopardy Clause And The
Principle Of Dual Sovereignty
A. The Double Jeopardy Clause
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution provides that no person shall "be sub-
ject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb."'7 The prohibition against double jeopardy insulates individu-
als from being subject to a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense arising either after acquittal or after conviction, and pro-
hibits multiple punishments arising out of the same offense.8 The
Double Jeopardy Clause guarantees that when a jury acquits a de-
fendant, the government shall not be permitted to make repeated,
or successive, attempts to convict him or her.9
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to
the federal government and to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.1" The prohibition against double jeopardy is also
found in the constitution or jurisprudence of every state in the
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8. The Supreme Court has stated "that the Double Jeopardy Clause provides for
three related protections: 'It protects against a second prosecution for the same of-
fense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense
after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense."'
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975) (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)).
The prohibition against multiple prosecutions has been regarded as so important by
the Supreme Court "that exceptions to the principle have been only grudgingly al-
lowed." Id. Moreover, the Court noted that it "has granted the Government the
right to retry a defendant after a mistrial only where 'there is a manifest necessity for
the act or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated."' Id. at 344 (quot-
ing United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824)).
9. Id. at 343.
10. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969), overruling Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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Union and the common law tradition of the colonies." Several
states augment the United States Constitution's double jeopardy
protection by barring state prosecutions in cases where defendants
have previously been tried by an independent prosecuting author-
ity, such as the United States or another state. 2
1. Policy Rationale for the Double Jeopardy Clause
The Fifth Amendment bar on successive prosecutions protects
an individual's interests that are implicated when that individual is
subjected to repeated criminal proceedings arising from the same
underlying conduct. 13 The Supreme Court justices and legal schol-
ars suggest that the prohibition against double jeopardy protects
the integrity of jury acquittals,"4 the finality interest of defend-
ants, 15 prevents excessive and oppressive prosecutorial discretion, 16
11. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 154 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
12. See State v. Fletcher, 259 N.E.2d 146, 158 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970), rev'd, 271
N.E.2d 507 (1971), cert. denied sub nom Walker v. Ohio, 404 U.S. 1024 (1972) (Ap-
pendix A) (listing statutory enactments prohibiting double jeopardy where there has
been a conviction or acquittal under the laws of another jurisdiction in a prior pro-
ceeding) (citing ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-146 (1956); CAL. PENAL CODE § 656
(Deering 1961); IDAHO CODE § 19-315 (1948); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 para. 3-4
(Smith-Hurd 1964); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-215 (Bums 1956); MONT. CODE ANN. § 94-
4703 (1947); NEV. REV. STAT. § 208.020 (1967); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 139 (McKinney
1958); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-05-05 (1961); OKL. STAT. tit. 22, § 25 (1969); OR. REV.
STAT. § 131.240(1) (1968); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-5-8 (1967); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-1-25 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.43.040 (West 1956); Wis. STAT.
§ 939.74 (1967)).
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire construes the double jeopardy prohibition
of the state's constitution to bar successive trials regardless of the identity of the ini-
tial prosecuting authority. State v. Hogg, 385 A.2d 844, 847 (N.H. 1978). The New
Hampshire Constitution provides that "[N]o subject shall be liable to be tried, after
an acquittal, for the same crime or offense." N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 16 (1784).
13. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320-23 (1978) (finding that the
Double Jeopardy Clause bars successive prosecutions brought by the national govern-
ment, the states and Native American tribal nations); Ronald J. Allen & John P.
Ratnaswamy, Heath v. Alabama: A Case Study of Doctrine and Rationality in the
Supreme Court, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 801, 806 (1985)..
14. Donald E. Burton, Note, A Closer Look at the Supreme Court and the Double
Jeopardy Clause, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 799, 805 (1988); Peter Westen, The Three Faces of
Double Jeopardy, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1002 (1980); Robert C. Gorman, Note, The
Second Rodney King Trial: Justice in Jeopardy?, 27 AKRON L. REV. 57, 87 n.30 (1993);
see also United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978) (observing that "the primary
purpose of the double jeopardy clause was to protect the integrity of a final
judgment").
15. Burton, supra note 14, at 805; Gorman, supra note 14, at 87 n.30; see United
States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975) (finding that the "principles of fairness and
finality require that [the defendant] not be subjected to the possibility of further pun-
ishment by being again tried for the same offense") (citations omitted).
16. Burton, supra note 14, at 805; Gorman, supra note 14, at 87 n.30.
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and ensures that defendants will not be forced to endure the anxi-
ety, expense, and increased likelihood of conviction resulting from
repeated prosecutions.17
2. History of the Double Jeopardy Clause
Early common law of the several States and Great Britain
barred successive prosecutions by foreign sovereigns. 18 During the
17. See Wilson, 420 U.S. at 343 (finding that successive attempts by the govern-
ment to convict subjects a defendant to "'embarrassment, expense and ordeal...
compelling him [or her] to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well
as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he [or she] may be found
guilty"') (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957)).
18. Allen & Ratnaswamy, supra note 13, at 810; see George C. Pontikes, Dual
Sovereignty and Double Jeopardy: A Critique of Bartkus v. Illinois and Abbate v.
United States, 14 W. RES. L. REV. 700, 704-5 (1963); see, e.g., The King v. Roche, 168
Eng. Rep. 169 (Cr. Cas. 1775).
The concept of barring multiple trials and punishments has ancient roots. Bartkus
v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151-55 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) ("Fear and abhorrence of
governmental power to try people twice for the same conduct is one of the oldest
ideas found in western civilization."); Allen & Ratnaswamy, supra note 13, at 807.
The prohibition may be traced back to Greek and Romantimes, Bartkus, 359 U.S. at
151-52 (Black, J., dissenting) (observing that the "principle of double jeopardy... was
formulated in the Digest of Justinian as the precept that 'the governor should not
permit the same person to be again accused of a crime of which he had been acquit-
ted"') (citations omitted), and remained a guiding principle of justice throughout the
Dark Ages. Id. at 152 n.30. The church canons as early as 847 A.D. proclaimed that
"'[njot even God judges twice for the same act."' Id. at 155 n.4 (citations omitted).
The bar on successive prosecutions for the same conduct has been firmly estab-
lished in England since the thirteenth century. Id. at 152. The plea of autrefois acquit,
or former acquittal, is a "universal maxim of the English common law [which pro-
vides] that no person may be 'brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the
same offense."' Raymond C. Hurley, Note, Criminal Law - The Continued Validity of
Successive Prosecutions by State and Federal Governments for the Same Criminal Con-
duct, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 823, 823 n.3 (1978) (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES 335); Harlan R. Harrison, Federalism and Double Jeopardy: A Study in
the Frustration of Human Rights, 17 U. MIAMI L. REV. 306, 307 (1963). For a brief
synopsis of seminal English double jeopardy case law, see J.A.C. Grant, The Lanza
Rule of Successive Prosecutions, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1309, 1318-20 (1932). Moreover,
the prohibition established that a prior foreign prosecution for the same offense
barred a subsequent prosecution for that offense in England. Pontikes, supra, at 704-
5; see Regina v Azzopardi, 169 Eng. Rep. 115 (Cr. Cas. 1843); The King v. Roche, 168
Eng. Rep. 169 (Cr. Cas. 1775).
During the colonial period, American law generally followed earlier developments
in the English common law by extending the principles of double jeopardy to non-
capital offenses. Allen & Ratnaswamy, supra note 13, at 808-09 (citing J. SIGLER,
DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 2, at 19,
23-24 (1969)). However, at the time of the First Congress, only New Hampshire had a
constitutional provision prohibiting double jeopardy. See Wilson, 420 U.S. at 340; see
also State v. Hogg, 385 A.2d 844, 845 (N.H. 1978). "[T]wo other states suggested that
a double jeopardy clause be included among the first amendments to the Federal
Constitution." Wilson, 420 U.S. at 340. In order to accommodate these requests,
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deliberations that ensued regarding the proposed amendment, the
record of the debate indicates that the framers intended to imple-
ment their understanding of English common law, 19 and did not
intend to abandon a unitary concept of a single and supreme sover-
eign when they embraced federalism.2 °
The report of the debate over the language of the proposed
amendment illustrates that there was a general agreement that
while a defendant could have a second trial after conviction, the
government was not entitled to have a new trial following an ac-
quittal.2 1 Additionally, the House of Representatives rejected ver-
sions of the proposed Fifth Amendment which added the phrase
"'by any law of the United States' after the words 'same
offense.' "22
James Madison appended a prohibition against double jeopardy to the proposed ver-
sion of the Bill of Rights he submitted to the House of Representatives. Id. at 340-41.
19. Allen & Ratnaswamy, supra note 13, at 809-10; see I ANNALS OF CONG. 753 (J.
Gales ed. 1789).
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 494 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.
1961) ("the national and State [judicial] systems are to be regarded as one whole");
Gorman, supra note 14, at 70 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 516 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed. 1961)).
Commentators have advocated that principles of federalism, as embodied in the
dual sovereignty doctrine, could not have been in the minds of the founding fathers.
See, e.g., Hogg, 385 A.2d at 845. Alexander Hamilton, one of the framers of the
Federal Constitution, interpreted Article III as granting Congress the authority to
establish inferior federal courts with the authority to exercise appellate powers over
state tribunals. THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 493-94 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed. 1961).
Hamilton's writings suggest that opposition to the judicial powers of the United
States under the Constitution stemmed from the concern that local tribunals would
not have the authority to hear cases implicating federal jurisdiction and that certain
procedural guarantees and substantive rights which were not contained in the Consti-
tution could be denied. See THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton); THE
FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). The predilection favoring concurrent ju-
risdiction, see THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 491-92 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed. 1961), and the integration of national and state tribunals stands in stark
contrast to the current conception of federalism and dual sovereignty.
21. See Wilson, 420 U.S. at 342 n.9. During the debate, Representative Sherman
remarked that a defendant should not be retried following an acquittal. Representa-
tive Sherman commented, "if the (defendant) was acquitted on the first trial, he ought
not to be tried a second time; but if he was convicted on the first, and any thing should
appear to set the judgment aside, he was entitle to second, which was certainly
favorable to him." I ANNALS OF CONG. 753 (J. Gales ed. 1789); see Wilson, 420 U.S.
at 342 n.9.
22. Allen & Ratnaswamy, supra note 13, at 809; see Pontikes, supra note 18, at 704
n.32.
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B. The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine
The dual sovereignty doctrine is the only exception to the
Double Jeopardy Clause. 3 It provides that two sovereigns, which
derive their power from different sources, 4 may individually or
both prosecute an offender for an infraction arising from the same
conduct which violates the laws of each.25 The principle of dual
sovereignty does not expressly appear in the United States Consti-
tution, any state constitution or in Black's Law Dictionary.26
Rather, the dual sovereignty doctrine is a creation of judicial craft-
ing.27 In 1852, the principle of dual sovereignty was first articu-
lated in dicta in Moore v. Illinois.28 The Supreme Court did not
apply the doctrine, however, until 1922 in United States v. Lanza.29
The dual sovereignty doctrine has foundations in the common
law premise that a crime is an offense against the sovereignty of the
government.30 As a result, when a single act by an offender trans-
23. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S.
377 (1922).
24. Lanza, 260 U.S. at 381-84.
25. See id.; Kevin J. Hellmann, Note, The Fallacy of Dueling Sovereignties: Why
the Supreme Court Refuses to Eliminate the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, 2 J.L. & POL'Y
149, 150 (1994).
26. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
27. See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
28. 55 U.S. 13, 19-20 (1852). The Court stated that:
An offence, in its legal signification, means the transgression of a law. A
man may be compelled to make reparation in damages to the injured party,
and be liable also to punishment for a breach of the public peace, in conse-
quence of the same act; and may be said, in common parlance, to be twice
punished for the same offence. Every citizen of the United States is also a
citizen of a State or territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to two sov-
ereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of
either. The same act may be an offence or transgression of the laws of both.
Id.; see Allen & Ratnaswamy, supra note 13, at 812.
Moore was the executor of the estate of Richard Eels, Moore, 55 U.S. at 13, who
had been convicted of violating an Illinois statute which proscribed the harboring of
fugitive slaves. Id. at 17. The petitioner argued that the Illinois statute was pre-
empted by the Fugitive Slave Act and that Eels was potentially subject to double
jeopardy as he could have faced prosecution under both the state and federal statutes.
Id. at 13-16.
The Court found that the essential nature of the statutes were dissimilar, distin-
guishing the statutes on the grounds that the underlying purpose of the federal statute
was to protect property interests of slave owners, whereas the Illinois statute's goal
was to bar black persons from the state, and that the definitions of, and punishments
for, violating the respective statutes were dissimilar. Id. at 18-19. Although the ques-
tion of double jeopardy was thus rendered moot, the Court proceeded to formulate
the doctrine of dual sovereignty. Id. at 19-20.
29. 260 U.S. 377 (1922); See Allen & Ratnaswamy, supra note 13, at 810.
30. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1985).
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gresses the laws of two sovereigns, he or she has committed two
distinct criminal offenses.3 Consequently, when applying the dual
sovereignty doctrine, courts must determine whether the two pros-
ecuting authorities are independent sovereigns.3 z
The dual sovereignty doctrine has been described as a by-prod-
uct of the United States' system of federalism.33 Federalism refers
to a system of government where power is divided between a cen-
tral government which regulates national affairs and local govern-
ments which regulate local affairs.34 Under the federalist system,
the central and local governments are distinct entities drawing their
respective sovereign powers from different sources.35 Accordingly,
in a federalist system of justice, a federal prosecution does not bar
a subsequent state prosecution, and a state prosecution does not
bar subsequent federal prosecution, even where the same underly-
ing conduct is the basis for both prosecutions.36 This principle also
applies to successive prosecutions brought by two or more different
states. 37 Federalism permits reprosecutions regardless of whether
or not the initial prosecution resulted in acquittal.38
31. Id. (citing Lanza, 260 U.S. at 382).
32. Id. (finding that in order to apply the doctrine of dual sovereignty "the crucial
determination is whether the two entities that seek successively to prosecute a de-
fendant for the same course of conduct can be termed separate sovereigns") (citing
Moore, 55 U.S. at 18-20).
33. United States v. Davis, 906 F.2d 829, 832 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that the doc-
trine of dual sovereignty does not bar successive state and federal prosecutions).
34. Federalism has been defined as:
[A] system of government wherein power is divided by a constitution be-
tween a central government and local governments, the local governments
maintaining control over local affairs and the central government being ac-
corded sufficient authority to deal with the national needs and affairs. Since
the United States is a federal "republic," considerations of federalism play a
major role in the interpretation of the Constitution.
BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 182 (2d ed. 1990).
35. Davis, 906 F.2d at 832 (observing that under the federalist system, "the state
and national government are distinct political communities, drawing their separate
sovereign power from different sources, each from the organic law that established
it").
36. Id. (finding that under the United States' federalist system of justice, each sov-
ereign "has the power, inherent in any sovereign, independently to determine what
shall be an offense against its authority and to punish such offenses. When a single act
violates the laws of two sovereigns, the wrongdoer has committed two distinct of-
fenses."); see generally United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 316-20 (1978) (holding
that both the United States and Indian Tribal Nations are independent sovereigns and
may each prosecute a defendant for offenses arising out of the same conduct).
37. Davis, 906 F.2d at 832; see Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 91-93 (1985).
38. Hellmann, supra note 25, at 151. For example, in United States v. Koon, the
court held that a Los Angeles police officer who was acquitted of beating motorist
Rodney King in the state trial, could be prosecuted by the United States for violating
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The dual sovereignty doctrine is limited only by the sham excep-
tion.39 It provides that a prosecution by one sovereign may not be
used as a "cover and a tool" 40 of another sovereign seeking to pros-
ecute a defendant.4 Where a subsequent prosecution brought by a
second sovereign is pursued merely on behalf of the first sover-
eign's interest in the successful prosecution of an individual de-
fendant rather than to vindicate its own interest, the subsequent
prosecution may be subject to a successful double jeopardy chal-
lenge.41 The sham exception, however, is construed narrowly and
seldom pursued successfully. 43
In recent years, the proliferation of federal legislation criminaliz-
ing conduct already proscribed by the states has increased the op-
portunity for state and federal authorities to bring successive
prosecutions.44 In particular, following the passage of the Civil
King's civil rights arising out of the same incident. 833 F. Supp 769, 790 (C.D. Cal.
1993), affd in relevant part, 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted to review sen-
tencing only, 116 S. Ct. 39 (1995). On April 17, 1993, a Federal jury convicted Sergeant
Stacey C. Koon and Officer Laurence M. Powell of the Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment of violating motorist Rodney King's civil rights. Id. at 774. A California jury
had acquitted Koon on all state charges on April 29, 1992 stemming from the March 3,
1991 beating of Rodney King that was captured on videotape by a passing motorist.
See Chronicle Wire Services, Winning and Losing Tactics in the Case: Jurors Wouldn't
Say, 'Enough Is Enough', S.F. CHRON., April 30, 1992, at A10.
39. Davis, 906 F.2d at 832 (citing Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 123-24); United States v.
Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553, 1563 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Russotti, 717 F.2d 27, 31
(2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 309 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 946 (1980).
40. Russotti, 717 F.2d at 31 (quoting Aleman, 609 F.2d at 309).
41. Id.
42. United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1438 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted to re-
view sentencing only, 116 S. Ct. 39 (1995).
43. Id. at 1439 n.19; see, e.g., United States v. Figueroa-Soto, 938 F.2d 1015, 1018-
19 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1098 (1992) (holding that the "sham" excep-
tion did not apply where the state prosecuted the defendant at the request of the
federal authorities, and federal authorities sat at the prosecutor's table, testified as
witnesses, collected evidence for use by the state in the state prosecution, postponed
sentencing a prosecution witness until after he testified for the state, prepared wit-
nesses for the state, delayed a forfeiture proceeding to avoid prejudicing the state
prosecution, and the state prosecutor was appointed as a special assistant to the U.S.
Attorney for the subsequent federal prosecution); United States v. Paiz, 905 F.2d
1014, 1024 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 924 (1991) (compiling a list of cases
where a "sham" prosecution was alleged).
44. Daniel A. Braun, Praying to False Sovereigns: The Rule Permitting Successive
Prosecutions in the Age of Cooperative Federalism, 20 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 8-9 (1992).
The Supreme Court has permitted Congress to "federalize" state crimes by rational-
izing that virtually every act affects interstate commerce. However, in United States
v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), the vitality of the Dormant Commerce Clause was
brought into question as the Court invalidated the Gun-Free School Zone Act, 18
U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1994), finding that the possession of a gun in a local school
1997]
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Rights Act of 1964,4s federal prosecutions for civil rights violations
have comprised a large number of cases involving successive state
and federal prosecutions.46
Successive prosecutions, however, are not the norm.47 One sov-
ereign usually defers to the other in the normal exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. 41 Under the Petite policy, a long-standing
guideline adopted by the United States Department of Justice,49
the United States voluntarily abstains from bringing a federal ac-
tion following a state prosecution unless the reasons are "compel-
ling" and authorization is obtained from an appropriate Assistant
Attorney General.5 0 The United States rarely pursues successive
prosecutions under the Petite policy 51 and several states have de-
clined to invoke the dual sovereignty doctrine. 2
zone was not an economic activity that substantially affected interstate commerce.
Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1630-31. If the wake of Lopez, however, the Courts of Appeal
have sustained the vast majority of federal criminal statutes that contain a jurisdic-
tional element where there is a minimal nexus to interstate commerce. See, e.g.,
United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564, 569-71 (6th Cir. 1996) (affirming the conviction
for the federal offense for the possession of a firearm by a felon where the minimal
nexus requirement was met by virtue of the fact that at some point prior to the pos-
session of the gun by the appellant, it had traveled in interstate commerce). But see
United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 526-28 (9th Cir. 1995) (reversing a con-
viction under federal arson statute finding an insufficient nexus to interstate com-
merce where the only link between the personal residence that was set ablaze and
interstate commerce was the receipt of natural gas from out-of-state sources).
45. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a to h-6 (West 1997).
46. See generally Michal A. Belknap, The Vindication of Burke Marshall: The
Southern Legal System and the Anti-Civil-Rights Violence of the 1960s, 33 EMORY L.J.
93 (1984); Michal A. Belknap, The Legacy of Lemuel Penn, 25 How. L.J. 467 (1982).
The outrage over the murder of Col. Lemuel Penn and the acquittal of his con-
fessed murderers by a jury in Georgia ultimately resulted in the broad application of
the dual sovereignty doctrine to enforce the civil rights laws. Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall, who at the time was the United States Solicitor General, prosecuted the case.
The facts of the case involving the murder of Lemuel Penn appear in Myers v. United
States, 377 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 929 (1968) (the appeal
involved evidentiary matters unrelated to issues concerning double jeopardy and dual
sovereignty).
47. United States v. Davis, 906 F.2d 829, 833 (2d Cir. 1990).
48. Id.; see UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 2.142, reprinted in 7 THE DE-
PARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL (P-H) § 9-2.142 (1987 & Supp. 1996-1); Petite v.
United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960) (per curiam).
49. Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 24 and 25 n.5 (1977) (citing Petite, 361
U.S. at 530-31).
50. Id. at 25 n.5 (citing Petite, 361 U.S. at 530-31 (citation omitted)).
51. Id. at 24-25.
52. See supra note 12; see, e.g., State v. Hogg, 385 A.2d 844 (N.H. 1978).
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H. The Supreme Court's Dual Sovereignty Jurisprudence
Regarding Successive Prosecutions Brought By
Independent Sovereigns
The Supreme Court consistently holds that the dual sovereignty
doctrine is virtually beyond reproach regarding successive prosecu-
tions brought by independent sovereigns. 5 3 The Court's reasons
for upholding the doctrine's constitutional validity, however, has
undergone significant changes. 4 An examination of the evolution
of the Court's dual sovereignty jurisprudence is essential to under-
standing the present application of the doctrine.
The Court first applied the dual sovereignty exception to the
Double Jeopardy Clause in United States v. Lanza. In Lanza, the
defendants were convicted by the State of Washington for illegally
manufacturing, transporting, and possessing alcohol. 56  Subse-
quently, the United States sought to prosecute the defendants for
contravening the National Prohibition Act.57
The Supreme Court held that since the Fifth Amendment applies
only to the federal government, the Double Jeopardy Clause did
not bar a single prosecution brought by the United States where
the initial prosecution was brought by a state.58 The Court con-
cluded that if the federal government could prosecute a defendant
once, and a state government could prosecute a defendant as many
times as it so desired, that there was no impediment to the two
53. See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89-90 (1985) (discussing prior cases
where the Court ruled that successive prosecutions brought by independent sover-
eigns were permissible under the dual sovereignty doctrine).
54. Compare United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922) (finding that successive
prosecutions were permissible under the dual sovereignty doctrine because the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the states) with
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (upholding the dual sovereignty doc-
trine based upon principles of federalism and past Supreme Court precedents despite
the incorporation of the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy protection to the states).
55. 260 U.S. 377 (1922); see Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 129 (1959) (observing
that Lanza was the first case in which the Supreme Court applied the doctrine of dual
sovereignty).
56. Lanza, 260 U.S. at 379.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 380-81. The holding in Lanza was based upon the precedent set by the
Court in Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833) (holding
that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment was not binding on the states), which
found that the rights guaranteed in the first eight amendments did not apply to the
states. Id. at 250. The landmark decision in Barron served as the basis for denying
double jeopardy protection for successive state and federal prosecutions until 1969
although Barron did not explicitly address the Double Jeopardy Clause or issues con-
cerning combinations of state and federal action. See Akhil Reed Amar and Jonathan
L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1995).
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governments doing in tandem what each was allowed to do alone.59
Moreover, the Court found that the dual sovereignty exception fur-
thered the policy objective of avoiding a race by defendants to
enter guilty pleas in the courts of those states that imposed only
nominal penalties for the offense, allowing them to secure immu-
nity from subsequent federal prosecution and undermining the fed-
eral statute's deterrent effect.6 °
The Supreme Court first upheld the constitutionality of the prin-
ciple of dual sovereignty, in the context of successive prosecutions
by independent sovereigns where the first prosecution resulted in
acquittal, in Bartkus v. Illinois.61 In Bartkus, the petitioner was ac-
quitted of federal charges for bank robbery.62 Illinois subsequently
tried and convicted the petitioner for violating a state robbery stat-
ute and sentenced him to life imprisonment under the Illinois Ha-
bitual Criminal Statute.63 The Court, following its reasoning in
Lanza, affirmed the state conviction based upon the inapplicability
of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
states.64 The majority stated that the principle of dual sovereignty
must be applied to ensure that the reserved powers of states to
promulgate and enforce state criminal offenses would not be dis-
placed in derogation of the federal system of government.65
Abbate v. United States, 66 although it did not involve successive
prosecutions following an acquittal, 67 is significant because it pro-
59. Lanza, 260 U.S. at 385.
60. Id.
61. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
62. Id. at 121-22.
63. Id. at 122.
64. Id. at 128-29. The Court based its decision upon the holding in Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
In Palko, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not apply to the states
because immunity from successive prosecutions was not "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty," and thus was not valid as against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 324-25. Like Barron, Palko provided the basis for upholding the
dual sovereignty doctrine on the grounds that the states were not bound by the stric-
tures of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 127. The majority in
Bartkus was comprised of five justices as four justices dissented.
65. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 137. The majority noted that to hold otherwise would
result in "a shocking and untoward deprivation of the historic right and obligation of
the states to maintain peace and order within their confines." Id.
66. 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (holding that a subsequent federal prosecution is not
barred by a prior state prosecution of the same defendant for the same underlying
conduct). Bartkus and Abbate were both decided on March 30, 1959.
67. In Abbate, the defendants were initially convicted of conspiracy under an Illi-
nois statute and were subsequently convicted in a federal prosecution for conspiracy
based upon the same underlying conduct. 359 U.S. at 188-89.
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vided the Court's policy-based arguments supporting the dual sov-
ereignty doctrine.68 In Abbate, the Court found that the
application of the dual sovereignty doctrine furthered the interest
of promoting the efficiency of federal law enforcement and noted
the impracticality of requiring federal authorities to keep informed
of all state prosecutions that might have some bearing on federal
offenses.69
In 1969, the constitutionality of the Supreme Court's dual sover-
eignty doctrine was called into question following the Court's deci-
sion in Benton v. Maryland7' that Fifth Amendment double
jeopardy protection was binding upon the states.71 Nine years ear-
lier in Elkins v. United States,72 an analogous case involving the
incorporation of the Fourth Amendment to the states, the Supreme
Court held that evidence seized by state officials in violation of the
Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in a federal prosecution. 73 El-
kins overruled prior precedents which found such evidence to be
admissible in the absence of the Fourth Amendment's protection
against illegal searches and seizures. 4 Since the constitutionality
of the dual sovereignty doctrine at that time was predicated upon
68. The reasoning in Abbate has served as the foundation for the dual sovereignty
doctrine's continued validity following incorporation of Fifth Amendment double
jeopardy protection to the states. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 316-20
(1978); Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985). Incorporation refers to the applica-
tion of the first eight amendments to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 777-86 (2d ed. 1991) (providing cases and commentary on the incorpora-
tion controversy). The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment applied to the
states in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). The Court, in the cases fol-
lowing Benton, upheld the doctrine of dual sovereignty based upon the principles of
federalism. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 316-20; Heath, 474 U.S. at 88.
69. Abbate, 359 U.S. at 195.
70. 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (finding that retrial of defendant by the State of Maryland
for larceny, a crime he had previously been acquitted of in state court, violated the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy). In Benton, the defendant had
initially been convicted of burglary and acquitted of larceny. Id. at 785. When the
defendant appealed his burglary conviction, the Maryland Court of Appeals set aside
the conviction and remanded his case to a trial court for reindictment and new trial on
both the burglary and larceny counts. Id. at 785-86. The defendant was convicted of
both crimes in the subsequent trial. Id. at 786.
71. Id. at 794.
72. 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (reversing convictions of defendants who had been found
guilty of violating the Communications Act and conspiring to violate the Communica-
tions Act by illegally intercepting, recording and divulging wired communications).
73. Id. at 214-15; see also United States v. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d 200, 203 (2d Cir.
1987) (noting that the Supreme Court in Elkins "held that evidence seized by state
officials in violation of the United States Constitution is subject to the federal exclu-
sionary rule").
74. See Elkins, 364 U.S. at 214-15.
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the inapplicability of the Fifth Amendment to the states, Benton
appeared to signal an end to the doctrine's validity. In 1978, in
United States v. Wheeler,75 the Supreme Court faced the first post-
Benton challenge to the constitutionality of the dual sovereignty
doctrine. In Wheeler, the Court reaffirmed the validity of the doc-
trine based on the weight of authority established by Lanza, Bart-
kus and Abbate,76 and on the principles of federalism.77 Since
Benton, the Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionality of
the dual sovereignty doctrine on only two occasions78 and has not
granted certiorari to hear a constitutional challenge to the doctrine
since 1985. 79
75. 435 U.S. 313 (1978). In Wheeler, the respondent, a Navajo tribal member,
pleaded guilty in a tribal court for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. More
than one year later, a federal grand jury indicted him for statutory rape arising out of
the same incident. The district court then dismissed the indictment finding a violation
of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 314-16. The
Supreme Court, determining that Native American tribal nations are sovereigns, re-
versed the dismissal of the indictment reasoning that the dual sovereignty doctrine
shielded the subsequent federal prosecution from violating the prohibition against
double jeopardy. Id. at 319-20.
76. Id. at 316-20 (finding that precedents themselves which upheld the constitu-
tionality of the dual sovereignty doctrine served as a basis for the doctrine's continued
validity).
77. Id. at 320 (observing that in a federalist system each independent sovereign
has the right to determine what constitutes an offense against its sovereignty and the
authority to punish those persons committing such offenses).
78. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985) (holding that the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not bar successive prosecutions brought by different states); United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (finding that Native American tribal nations
are distinct sovereigns from the United States and that successive federal and tribal
prosecutions are protected from double jeopardy challenges by the dual sovereignty
doctrine).
79. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985), marked the last time the Court granted
certiorari to hear a challenge to the dual sovereignty doctrine. In Heath, the second
post-Benton constitutional challenge to the principle of dual sovereignty, the Court
upheld the validity of the doctrine in the context of successive prosecutions brought
by two states. Heath, 474 U.S. at 93. Heath pleaded guilty to the charges of commit-
ring kidnapping and murder in Georgia in exchange for a sentence of life imprison-
ment. Id. at 84. Subsequently, Alabama indicted, convicted and sentenced Heath to
death for the same acts. Id. at 84-85. The Supreme Court premised its affirmation of
the subsequent conviction on two main grounds: that dual sovereignty is supported
by the concept of federalism, id. at 89-90, and that a State is entitled to decide
whether a prosecution by another State has vindicated its own sovereign powers. Id.
at 92-93.
366
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
III. Criticisms Of The Application Of The Dual Sovereignty
Doctrine Regarding Successive State And Federal
Prosecutions Where The Initial Prosecution
Resulted In Acquittal
The continued validity and scope of the dual sovereignty doc-
trine must be assessed in light of its relation to the constitutional
mandate prohibiting double jeopardy and the protection of individ-
ual interests conferred by the Constitution. In the more than one
decade since the Court last heard a challenge to the dual sover-
eignty doctrine,80 much has changed regarding technology em-
ployed by, and the cooperation existing between, law enforcement
agencies,81 the proliferation of federal criminal legislation82 and the
Court's own views on federalism.83 The policy justifications for the
doctrine are no longer as compelling as they once were. In the
absence of historical, structural or textual support for the applica-
tion of the dual sovereignty doctrine,84 the question concerning its
constitutionality should be revisited.
A. Criticisms of the Dual Sovereignty Exception to the Double
Jeopardy Clause
1. Constitutional Interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause
The text of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
provides no exceptions.85 Its language expressly extends the
double jeopardy prohibition to all persons8 6 and does not qualify
the identity of the prosecuting authority.87 Moreover, incorpora-
80. The Court last addressed the validity of the dual sovereignty doctrine in 1985.
See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985).
81. See People v. Cooper, 247 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Mich. 1976).
82. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
83. See generally United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (invalidating the
Gun-Free School Zones Act under the Commerce Clause as an impermissible intru-
sion by the federal government on the police powers of the state in derogation of the
nation's federalist system).
States' rights proponents can argue that allowing the federal government to rep-
rosecute a criminal defendant acquitted previously by the state infringes upon the
sovereignty of the state and thus violates the principle of federalism.
84. See infra Part III.A.1.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. V. For an interesting discussion on the issue of statutory
interpretation, see Stephen A. Plass, The Illusion and Allure of Textualism, 40 VILL.
L. REV. 93 (1995). See generally Lynn M. Boughey, A Judge's Guide to Constitutional
Interpretation, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1269 (1993).
86. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("Nor shall any person be subject to .... ") (emphasis
added).
87. Id. The identity of the prosecuting authority to which the prohibition applies
does not appear in the text, only the words "same offence." Id.
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tion of the Double Jeopardy Clause to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment undermines the foundation for permitting
successive prosecutions based upon the sovereignty of the prose-
cuting authorities:
The Supreme Court has conspicuously failed to premise its inter-
pretation of the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against double
jeopardy upon the original intent of its framers and ratifiers.88 The
legislative history of the Double Jeopardy Clause suggests that the
framers did not intend to provide, for an exception.89 The omission
of the phrase qualifying the identity of the prosecuting authority as
the 'United States' in the proposed language of the clause90 sug-
gests by negative inference that the framers and ratifiers of the
Double Jeopardy Clause intended the prohibition to apply to both
state and federal governments alike.91 Consequently, the framers
88. Justice Thurgood Marshall commented that:
It is curious ... how reluctant the Court has always been to ascertain the
intent of the Framers in this area. The furthest the Court has ever
progressed on such an inquiry was to note: "It has not been deemed rele-
vant to discussion of our problem to consider dubious English precedents
concerning the effect of foreign criminal judgments on the ability of English
Courts to try charges arising out of the same conduct."
Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 98 n.1 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Bart-
kus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 128 n.9 (1959)).
89. "The best [available] evidence of the intent of the framers indicates that the
double jeopardy clause was intended to apply to prosecutions by different sovereigns,
and that there was no exception for separate federal and state prosecutions for the
same act, let alone separate state prosecutions." Allen & Ratnaswamy, supra note 13,
at 816; see supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 22. and accompanying text.
91. The final version of the Double Jeopardy Clause does not indicate which sov-
ereign or sovereigns are prohibited from bringing multiple prosecutions. U.S. CONST.
amend. V. The elimination of the qualifying phrase which would have limited appli-
cation of the Clause to successive federal prosecutions leads to the conclusion that
double jeopardy protection under the Fifth Amendment was intended to extend to
both state and federal prosecutions.
There was little debate by Congress regarding the meaning of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. The debated focused primarily on the concern that the clause not bar appeals
by convicted defendants and retrials resulting therefrom. The debates did not dis-
close an intention to limit double jeopardy protection to bar only multiple federal
prosecutions. Rather, what debate that did occur suggested that the protection of
individual rights was at the core of the Constitutional guarantee. See I ANNALS OF
CONG. 753 (J. Gales ed. 1789); Allen & Ratnaswamy, supra note 13, at 809-10.
Justice Black stated he believed that "the Bill of Rights' safeguard against double
jeopardy was intended to establish a broad national policy against federal courts try-
ing ... a man a second time after acquittal or conviction in any court." Abbate, 359
U.S. at 203 (Black, J., dissenting).
The framers of the Federal Constitution did not intend for the Constitution to abol-
ish rights guaranteed by the states merely due to the fact that many safeguards were
not incorporated in the Constitution prior to the ratification of the Bill of Rights. See
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and ratifiers of the Fifth Amendment most likely understood the
prohibition against double jeopardy as precluding successive prose-
cutions brought by either the federal or state governments, regard-
less of the identity or sovereignty of the prosecuting authority in
the initial prosecution.
The structure of the Bill of Rights counsels against the employ-
ment of an exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Bill of
Rights, by establishing the prerequisites for a minimally fair crimi-
nal proceeding, does not invite the courts to balance the rights of
the individual against those of the government. 92 Rather, its dic-
tates are absolute: while the Fourth Amendment invites balancing
due to its employment of a "reasonableness" standard,93 the rules
of criminal procedure set forth in the Bill of Rights are more abso-
lute in their language.94 Therefore, the rules of criminal procedure
are less susceptible to arguments that their relinquishment are nec-
essary to prevent an injustice from occurring. 95 The objective of
procedural guarantees is that in order to ensure fairness, society
must assume the risk of harm that will inure from allowing a culpa-
ble defendant to escape punishment. 96 By contrast, the dual sover-
eignty doctrine which has at its heart the vindication of the right of
sovereigns to independently pursue the successful prosecution of
defendants, disregards the rights of defendants to be free from
THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (allaying fears of those who object to
the Constitution because it contained no Bill of Rights); THE FEDERALIST No. 83
(Alexander Hamilton) (maintaining that the Constitution would not serve to abolish
the right to jury trials). Therefore, it would be difficult to imagine that the federal
system established by the Constitution could have been seen by the ratifiers of the
Fifth Amendment as a vehicle by which rights conferred on individuals by the states
could be circumvented and the protection offered by the Double Jeopardy Clause
extremely limited. This is especially unlikely because the states were to retain their
pre-existing jurisdiction, see THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 492 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961), which included jurisdiction over criminal law.
92. Susan N. Herman, Reconstructing the Bill of Rights: A Reply to Amar and
Marcus's Triple Play on Double Jeopardy, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1090, 1105 (1995).
93. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of people to be secure... shall not
be violated, . . . but upon probable cause .. ") (emphasis added). The Fourth
Amendment's provision that rights may be abridged "upon probable cause" invites
courts to engage in balancing the interests of justice against interests defendants have
in the preservation of their rights.
94. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments, in contrast to the Fourth Amendment, do
not provide a basis for the court to engage in a balancing test. Herman, supra note 92,
at 1105; see U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
95. Herman, supra note 92, at 1105; see, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) (erecting safeguards to effectuate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding the Sixth Amend-
ment right of trial by jury applicable to the states).
96. Herman, supra note 92, at 1105-6.
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multiple prosecutions guaranteed to the Fifth Amendment. In ad-
dition, the Bill of Rights enumerates certain rights and protections
for the individual. It would be highly incongruous to conclude, as
the Supreme Court did in upholding the dual sovereignty doctrine,
that "individual rights deemed essential by both the State and Na-
tion were to be lost through the combined operations of the two
governments, '97 especially in light of the incorporation of the Fifth
Amendment's double jeopardy protection to the states.
2. Distinguishable Case Law
The Supreme Court's dual sovereignty jurisprudence has pro-
vides a basis for repudiating the continued validity of the doctrine
as presently applied. It is instructive to note the historical context
of the conception of the doctrine. When Moore v. Illinois was de-
cided in 1852,98 the dispute over states' rights threatened to engulf
the nation in civil war. In deference to the political climate, the
Moore Court sought to accommodate the competing interests of
the federal government and the states while being careful not to
exacerbate the conflict that existed in the nation.99 Consequently,
the conception of the principle of dual sovereignty arose from the
realm of the body politic. Notwithstanding, the Lanza Court's ap-
plication of the dual sovereignty doctrine rested heavily upon the
"precedent" set in the dicta of Moore.100
In both Lanza and Bartkus, the Court premised the constitution-
ality of the dual sovereignty doctrine on the inapplicability of the
Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy protection to the states.10 1
Accordingly, the Court's holding in Benton that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause was binding upon the states10 2 should have dealt the
doctrine a death knell as it undercut the very foundation of the
principle of dual sovereignty. 103
97. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 155-56 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
98. 55 U.S. 13 (1852); see supra note 28.
99. Allen & Ratnaswamy, supra note 13, at 812-14; Harrison, supra note 18, at
313.
100. See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
101. Id. at 380; Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 128-29.
102. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
103. Benton overruled Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (and Barron v.
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833)) by the incorporation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause, which the Bartkus Court relied on in upholding the viability
of the dual sovereignty doctrine. Therefore, the extension of double jeopardy protec-
tion to the states should have rendered successive prosecutions for the same act con-
stitutionally impermissible. See People v. Cooper, 247 N.W.2d 866, 869 (Mich. 1976);
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The Supreme Court's reasoning in Elkins supporting incorpora-
tion of the Fourth Amendment's protections against illegal
searches and seizures to the states,1°4 likewise should apply to Fifth
Amendment double jeopardy protection. The logic of the Elkins
Court illustrates that to the individual, there is little difference
whether his or her "constitutional right has been invaded by a fed-
eral agent or by a state officer."'1 °5 As a result, allowing the courts
to permit an abrogation of the constitutional guarantee prohibiting
double jeopardy based solely upon the identity of the prosecuting
authority "would be a curiously ambivalent rule."'01 6 However, by
permitting successive prosecutions, the dual sovereignty doctrine
deprive individuals of their right to be free from double jeopardy.
3. Policy Concerns
Despite the fact that the precedents the Court relied upon'0 7 are
themselves based upon precedents the Court has expressly over-
ruled,108 the Court continued to uphold the validity of the dual sov-
ereignty doctrine in the post-Benton era.10 9 Therefore, the validity
of the dual sovereignty doctrine rests on the Court's interpretation
of the concept of federalism and its efficient administration of jus-
tice justifications. 1 0
The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibition was conceived specifi-
cally to protect the individual from repeatedly having to suffer the
hardships of trial for the same alleged offense. 11' There is no foun-
dation for the premise that an individual who was acquitted in an
initial prosecution is more endangered by a subsequent prosecu-
tion brought by the same sovereign than he or she would be if the
State v. Fletcher, 259 N.E.2d 146 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970), rev'd, 271 N.E.2d 507 (1971),
cert. denied sub nom. Walker v. Ohio, 404 U.S. 1024 (1972); Rosenfeld, supra note 4.
104. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
105. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 215.
106. Id. (finding that it "would be a curiously ambivalent rule that would require
the courts of the United States to differentiate between ... [violations of the Constitu-
tion] upon so arbitrary a basis" as whether the authorities responsible for the viola-
tions were state or federal agents).
107. The Court relied upon the precedents set in United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S.
377 (1922), Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) and Abbate v. United States, 359
U.S. 187 (1959). See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 316-20 (1978).
108. See supra note 103.
109. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
313 (1978).
110. See Heath, 474 U.S. at 89-90; Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 320.
111. See supra note 5.
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second prosecution was brought by a different sovereign." 2 As a
result, the individual's interests, rather than the sovereign's, should
be considered when determining the circumstances under which
successive prosecutions may occur.113
The Court's current application of the dual sovereignty doctrine
as a broad exercise of federalism offends defendants' interests in
finality'14 and subjects them to arbitrary prosecutorial discretion." 5
The federal prosecution of Lemrick Nelson is illustrative of poten-
tial abuses that arise in the context of successive state and federal
prosecutions. The United States began its investigation nearly fif-
teen months after Nelson was acquitted by a New York jury and
almost three years after the alleged crime occurred. 116 Moreover,
as the case of Lemrick Nelson suggests, public outrage generated
by a jury verdict may constitute a "compelling" reason under the
Petite policy, paving the way for the United States to pursue a sub-
sequent prosecution. 117 What the Nelson case undoubtedly teaches
us is that allowing authorities two bites at the apple virtually guar-
antees conviction. Federal prosecutors not only benefited from the
powers of hindsight concerning prosecution strategies, but were
able to gain insight from interviews conducted with jurors from
Nelson's state trial, 118 had more resources and evidence at their
112. People v. Cooper, 247 N.W.2d 866, 869 (Mich. 1976); State v. Hogg, 385 A.2d
844, 847 (N.H. 1978).
113. Cooper, 247 N.W.2d at 869; Hogg, 385 A.2d at 847.
114. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
115. See Joseph P. Fried, Judge Asked to Dismiss Charges in Crown Heights Stab-
bing Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1995, at 27.
116. Id.
117. Attorney General Janet Reno succumbed to pressure brought by the Hasidic
community, politicians and the District Attorney of Kings County, Charles Hynes,
who lost the case. See Fried, supra note 115, at 27. Among the luminaries agitating
for Federal intervention included Mario Cuomo, who at the time was the Governor of
New York, United States Senator Alfonse D'Amato and Representative Charles
Schumer of Brooklyn and Queens. Jan Hoffman, Prosecution Errors in Earlier Trial
May Have Paved Way for Guilty Verdict, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 11, 1997, at B4.
Zachary W. Carter, the United States Attorney in Brooklyn whose office prose-
cuted the Federal case, following the announcement of the guilty verdict declared that
this prosecution brought the people most responsible for Yankel Rosenbaum's death
to justice. Nowhere in his statement did he mention the matter of civil rights. Fried,
supra note 1, at B4. This begs the question as to the "compelling" nature of the
prosecution. Whose rights are being vindicated? New York's in bringing murderers
to justice or the United States' in bringing civil rights violators to justice?
118. Hoffman, supra note 117, at B4. Governor Cuomo authorized an extensive
review of the state trial against Nelson, which came to be known as the "Girgenti
report." This report included interviews with jurors about what they saw as problems
in the trial and the report served Federal prosecutors as the "ultimate focus group."
Id.
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disposal,119 and were able to select a more 'favorable' panel from a
larger jury pool. 120
Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of the dual sovereignty
doctrine is that is employed as a means of correcting aberrant jury
verdicts.121 Additionally, some legal scholars suggest that the dual
sovereignty doctrine should be maintained as a means of ensuring
against verdicts based upon racist jury selection practices 122 and
tainted acquittals that result from affirmative illegal acts by the de-
fendant designed to affect the outcome of the trial. 23 Admittedly,
when our system of justice apparently fails us, it is often both desir-
able and reassuring when the federal government vindicates the in-
terests of society. 24 However, as the Supreme Court has held in
other contexts, protections guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
be abridged in order to mollify public disquiet. 125
119. Id. The Federal prosecutors had amateur videotapes and news services photo-
graphs and video at their disposal. Further, as years passed, Nelson spoke about the
events that occurred in Crown Heights with a trusted few, including a former girl-
friend who testified against him at his second trial. Id.
120. Id. The jury pool available to federal prosecutors was much broader than that
of Nelson's first trial where the state prosecutors were limited to residents of Brook-
lyn. By contrast, the second trial saw potential jurors being drawn from the Eastern
District of New York which includes Brooklyn, Queens, Staten Island and Long Is-
land. The composition of the juries differed greatly between the first and second tri-
als. In the state trial, six of the jurors were black, four were Hispanic, two were white
and none were Jewish. In the Federal trial, five jurors were white, two of whom were
Jewish, four were Hispanic, and three were black. Whether the makeup of the two
juries can explain the different verdicts is unknown. Id.
121. See Dwyer, supra note 2, at A2; Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 2.
122. See Amar and Marcus, supra note 58, at 50-51 (observing that the practice of
racist jury selection, which is illegal, can lead to acquittals of guilty defendants. The
authors used the example of the change in venue attained by counsel for the officers
videotaped beating Rodney King. As a result of the change in venue to Simi Valley,
California, the jury was mostly white and acquitted the defendants.).
123. Id. at 54-56 (discussing the suggestion that those defendants who are acquitted
by virtue of bribery, jury tampering or other illegal acts, be subject to a successive
prosecution as they illegally obtained their acquittals and because they do not possess
the requisite clean hands to come to a court of equity so that future proceedings
against them may be estopped or enjoined).
124. See Dwyer, supra note 2, at A2.
The prosecutions of Lemnrick Nelson and Stacey Koon for federal civil rights viola-
tions are the most recent and well-publicized examples of attempts by the federal
government to correct aberrant state jury verdicts. Stacey Koon was one of the Los
Angeles police officers captured on videotape beating motorist Rodney King. After a
California jury failed to convict any of the police officers responsible for beating King,
violent rioting ensued in Los Angeles. Koon was subsequently convicted by the
United States for violating Rodney King's civil rights. See supra note 38 and accom-
panying text.
125. For example, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court barred the
admissibility of statements made by a defendant where it was not demonstrated that
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The usurpation of the nullification power of juries undermines
the "sovereignty of the people," who, in their capacities as jurors,
have the option to nullify the law126 to prevent the state from per-
petrating miscarriages of justice. Some legal commentators argue
that the usurpation of the nullification power alone renders the
principle of dual sovereignty unconstitutional. 127 Several states, in-
cluding Illinois in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in
Bartkus,28 have refused to apply the doctrine. 29
In an age of "cooperative federalism, ' 130 law enforcement agen-
cies cannot be considered separate and independent. 31 Coopera-
tion among state and federal authorities is commonplace and their
interests in prosecuting criminal acts frequently coincide. 32 There
is no reason to believe that the spirit of cooperation that exists be-
tween federal and state authorities would be adversely affected by
enforcing the Double Jeopardy Clause. 33 In fact, the present doc-
trine often results in the complication of the plea bargaining pro-
cess as agreements not to extradite threaten to disrupt the efficient
administration of law enforcement. 34  Modern telecommunica-
tions technology and computer applications make coordination
among federal and state law enforcement authorities both feasible
procedural safeguards were used to effectively secure the privilege against self-incrim-
ination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 444.
126. Gorman, supra note 14, at 72.
127. Id. It has been argued that the principle of dual sovereignty is unconstitu-
tional because it impermissibly infringes upon the jury's right to nullify the law and:
denigrates the principle of popular sovereignty underlying the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause. An exercise of popular sovereignty is final and unappeala-
ble .... Having invited the popular will to check its authority, government
may not simply disregard it and try again.
Michael A. Dawson, Note, Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy and the Dual Sover-
eignty Doctrine, 102 YALE L. 281, 287 (1992).
128. See State v. Fletcher, 259 N.E.2d 146, 158-59 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970), rev'd, 271
N.E.2d 507 (1971), cert. denied sub nom. Walker v. Ohio, 404 U.S. 1024 (1972) (Ap-
pendix A) (observing that after Bartkus, Illinois passed a statute which would have
barred the subsequent state prosecution); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 3-4 (Smith-
Hurd 1964).
129. See supra note 12.
130. "Cooperative Federalism" is a term used by the Supreme Court to describe
the united front waged by federal and state governments against many types of crimi-
nal activities. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52,
56 (1964) (finding that a witness who was immune from prosecution under state law
could not be prosecuted under federal law on the basis of the incriminating testimony
the witness was thus compelled to propound under the Fifth Amendment as applied
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
131. See People v. Cooper, 247 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Mich. 1976).
132. Id.
133. Allen & Ratnaswamy, supra note 13, at 821.
134. Id. at 821-22.
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and desirable. Moreover, the federalist system which limits and
defines the powers of the national government, does not provide a
foundation for the proposition that the national government may
eschew its constitutional limitations merely by virtue of its relation-
ship to the states.
When the federal government seeks to prosecute a defendant
following an acquittal in a state prosecution, the interests and
rights of the defendant are often compromised or completely obvi-
ated by the dual sovereignty doctrine. Due to the cooperation
among the prosecuting authorities, the "sham" exception to the
dual sovereignty doctrine is invariably implicated, though virtually
never vindicated. 135
In situations where the government's delay in bringing the fed-
eral charges is excessive, the defendant's Sixth Amendment Right
to a speedy trial, 136 the protections conferred on a defendant under
the Speedy Trial Act 137 and the discretion the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure grants the court 138 likewise are implicated.
These claims, however, are usually summarily dismissed. 139
In addition, in cases where a civil rights prosecution is brought
following a state acquittal for the predicate offense, the issue of
collateral estoppel arises. 4 ° Courts often fail to find that state and
federal authorities are parties in interest, regardless of their level of
cooperation. 141 Correspondingly, although the Fifth Amendment
forbids successive prosecutions for greater and lesser included of-
135. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text for a discussion on the sham
exception.
136. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
137. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. (1994).
138. A court may dismiss an indictment when there has been unnecessary delay in
presenting the charge to a grand jury. FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Ng, 699 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1983). The Second Circuit
held that a reasonable belief by the government that the state would continue to pros-
ecute the defendants was a permissible reason for the delay in bringing federal
charges where there was no evidence of prejudice or that defendants actively pursued
their right to a speedy federal trial. Id. at 70.
140. Collateral estoppel simply means that when an issue of ultimate fact has once
been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot be relitigated be-
tween the same parties in a future proceeding. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443
(1970). In Ashe, the Supreme Court held that collateral estoppel could be applied by
defendants in criminal cases. Id. at 444.
141. "Collateral estoppel does not apply to successive prosecutions by the state and
federal governments because the party that the first defendant seeks to estop in the
second prosecution was not a party to the first trial." United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d
811, 819 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979).
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fenses,142 that defense is not available under the dual sovereignty
doctrine. 143
B. A Proposal for Application of the Dual Sovereignty
Doctrine
The Supreme Court should reconsider the constitutionality of its
dual sovereignty jurisprudence. Policy considerations which ignore
the realities of modern law enforcement practices and the blurring
of the distinction between federal and state criminal jurisdictions
cannot serve as the basis for denying constitutionally guaranteed
rights. Application of the doctrine must not infringe on individual
rights guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy Clause and should rely
on an independent source of constitutional authority which trumps
the Fifth Amendment's absolute prohibition against successive
prosecutions.
Some commentators suggest that the vitality of dual sovereignty
doctrine should be preserved as a civil rights exception to the
Double Jeopardy Clause.144 However, the civil rights laws provide
the federal government with the opportunity to vindicate the rights
of its citizens. 45 The inertia of the federal government to pursue
civil rights violations is a political issue that should not be resolved
by disregarding protections guaranteed by the Constitution.
Congress has the authority to reserve to the federal government
the determination as to whether the United States will execute its
prosecutorial jurisdiction. Federal criminal legislation may pre-
empt state criminal statutes towards that end. Additionally, Con-
gress can enact criminal statutes containing waiver and notification
provisions to ensure that the United States will have the opportu-
nity to vindicate its interests where it deems necessary. Employ-
ment of legislation with a waiver and notification provision permits
the United States to allow the states to prosecute all offenses over
which they share concurrent jurisdiction. As a result, the en-
142. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977).
143. Generally, prosecutions for civil rights violations require that the defendant
not only be guilty of the state crime, but that he or she additionally acted with the
intent to deprive another of his or her civil rights. Therefore an acquittal on the state
charge, the lesser included offense, should preclude conviction on the federal charge.
For example, in the case of Lemrick Nelson, the United States will have to prove
the predicate act of murder, a charge he was acquitted of in state court. See Rosen-
feld, supra note 5, at 2.
144. See generally Belknap, The Legacy of Lemuel Penn, supra note 46; see, e.g.,
Jim Dwyer, supra note 2, at A2.
145. See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 921 F. Supp. 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (prosecut-
ing Nelson under 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)).
376
DO UBLE JEOPARDY
croachment of the federal government on the police powers of the
state would be minimal.
The Supreme Court must specifically address the tension arising
from a rule of law that permits the United States to do in tandem
with the states what neither it nor the states are allowed to do indi-
vidually: to subject an individual who has been acquitted of a crim-
inal offense to reprosecution for the same offense. 146 This paradox
must be reconciled with cases, such as Elkins, which directly con-
tradict such a logical premise. 147 As an alternative to invalidating
the dual sovereignty doctrine, the Court should strictly confine its
application to cases where the defendant in the initial state pro-
ceeding committed a federal offense while acting under the color of
state authority. Under this "color of state authority" exception,
only the federal government would have the opportunity to seek a
subsequent prosecution.
A person acting under the color of state authority is arguably not
acting in his or her own individual capacity. Therefore, because the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment was designed to
protect the individual from abuses perpetrated by the national gov-
ernment, such an exception is constitutionally permissible. The
color of state authority exception, if qualified and narrowly con-
strued, may be consistent with the spirit of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which safeguards the interest of the individual against abuses
perpetrated by the state and Benton. In order to ensure that this
exception will be strictly confined, a finding would be necessary to
determine that the state, or agents thereof, acted in such a way as
to ensure that the defendant would not be convicted in the initial
state prosecution. Such A showing might entail proving that the
state did not vigorously prosecute the defendant. As a result, the
state never truly subjected the defendant to jeopardy in the first
instance. Antithetically, an aberrant jury verdict, by itself, would
not constitute a sufficient basis for applying the color of authority
exception. 48
Conclusion
The dual sovereignty doctrine regarding successive state and fed-
eral prosecutions as presently applied is repugnant to the spirit of
146. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
148. The color of authority exception would deny the United States the authority to
prosecute either Lemrick Nelson or Stacey Koon as evidence suggests that New York
and California, respectively, vigorously prosecuted the defendants.
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the constitutional protections guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy
Clause. The principle of dual sovereignty lacks foundation in the
text, history and structure of the Bill of Rights. Moreover, the pol-
icy rationale and the precedents upon which the Court has upheld
the doctrine have been undermined.
The Supreme Court should reconsider the validity of the dual
sovereignty doctrine and determine whether or not a narrower ap-
plication of the doctrine would be constitutionally permissible.
The proposed color of state authority exception may be a viable
alternative to the present application of the dual sovereignty doc-
trine to cases involving federal prosecutions following an acquittal
by a state jury for the same underlying conduct.
